This paper deals with the issue of the weak growth in Italian labor productivity with particular reference to the period between 2000 and 2016. In analyzing the data relating to labor productivity, the influence of capital productivity and multifactor productivity were also considered. The analysis shows how the weak growth in labor productivity is due to some peculiar structural aspects of the Italian production system. At the end of the paper some comments are offered on possible policy interventions.
States accelerated, so that a new productivity gap has opened up.
In this paper the period between 2000 and 2016 has been analyzed from various perspectives. First of all, the dynamics of labor productivity, the only for which an international comparison could be made, was analyzed. Next, the changes in Italian capital productivity and in what is known as multifactor productivity (MFP) were analyzed. Finally, we decided to focus on the components of labor productivity, capital deepening and MFP, in order to identify the possible causes of the slowdown in Italian labor productivity. After some consideration on the structural causes of this phenomenon, some attempt was made to propose possible solutions to the problem.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains an international comparison of labor productivity growth and an analysis of the possible consequences on unit labor costs and on real wages. Section 3 investigates both the dynamics of the capital and multifactor productivity and the components of labor productivity, still relating Italy to other countries. Section 4 presents some possible causes of the poor growth of Italian labor productivity. Section 5 concludes.
Labor Productivity: An International Comparison
With regard to labor productivity growth 1 (Table 1) , it can be seen that Italy is ranked last amongst OECD countries in the period between 2000 and 2016 [6] . The two countries with the most marked catching up are Latvia and Lithuania; however, despite having almost doubled their labor productivity, they are still very far from achieving the same Italian labor productivity levels. The most striking value is undoubtedly that of Ireland, which has almost doubled its labor productivity in 16 years, despite starting from values only slightly lower than those of Italy [7] . In the period 2000-2016, the average annual growth of labor productivity in Italy was definitely lower than that of the EU19 area (15.4%). As regards Italy's major competitors, Germany shows an 18.6% increase and France and Spain record labor productivity growth rates of 13.5% and 15.3% respectively, slightly below the Euro area average. Even Greece, with a growth rate much lower than the European average (6.5%), has a much better performance than Italy, which shows a disastrous growth rate of less than 1%. The National Statistics Institute (ISTAT) recently published a report confirming this data [8] .
Some considerations on Unit Labor Costs could be useful to support these observations. Unit labor costs (ULCs) measure the average cost of labor per unit of output. They are calculated by OECD Stat, as the ratio of total labor costs to real output. Annual ULCs can be expressed as the ratio of total labor compensation per hour worked to output per hour worked (labor productivity). [9] of the labor market which maximized mini-jobs), whilst it grew strongly in all Eurozone countries ( Figure 1 ).
In Germany, although the overall cuts in hours for workers were consistent As can be seen from Figure 2 , the increase in ULCs in Italy is due to a constant growth in labor compensation per hour worked (+40.2%), which is not accompanied by an adequate increase in labor productivity (+0.9%).
Next, the relationship between labor productivity and real wages should be considered. As regards the changes in real wages, OECD data shows that the effects of the economic crisis appear to have hit some European countries more than others.
In the case of Greece, which has particularly suffered from the international crisis due to an already serious internal situation, real wages have fallen dramatically since 2009 and the same is true in Spain. A similar slight decline in real wages can be observed both in the United Kingdom and, just more marked, in Italy. Peculiar and unusual is the case of France, but above all of Germany and the USA: in these countries, despite the international crisis, real wages are continuing to grow together with a strong increase in labor productivity. This shows that where labor productivity grows intensely and continuously, the economic crisis has no impact on real wages, which already tend to be rigid downwards. Real wages are thus proving to be a structural rather than a cyclical variable. All of the above is also supported when we look at the inflation trend: in Italy, nominal wages are growing in parallel with inflation, whilst real wages and labor productivity, as it has been seen, are actually remaining constant. In France, the increase in labor productivity was almost entirely passed on to the workers who received higher nominal, but also higher real, wages. Germany, instead, had a different policy: in this case, the increase in labor productivity was only partially reflected in an increase in real wages. The increased productivity was not entirely passed on the workers but, instead, mostly benefitted the German firms, which were thus able to gain ground in terms of competitiveness. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management
In other words, countries with lower growth in labor productivity tend, on the one hand, to have lower growth in real wages and therefore in domestic demand and, on the other hand, to have higher growth in ULCs. And this would probably have negative consequences as regards their foreign demand. Lower labor productivity therefore leads to lower growth in aggregate demand and, consequently, lower economic growth.
From Capital Productivity to the Components of Labor Productivity
As regards capital productivity, by contrast, 2 What is striking, however, is that, with the exception of Germany and Japan, Capital productivity shows how efficiently capital is used to generate output. It reflects the joint influence of labor input per unit of capital used and multifactor productivity (MFP); the latter reflecting the overall efficiency of production. Capital productivity is measured as the ratio between the volume of output (GDP), and the volume of capital input, defined as the flow of productive services that capital delivers in production, i.e. capital services. These services are estimated by the OECD using the rate of change of the productive capital stock, which takes into account wear and tear, retirements and other sources of reduction in the productive capacity of fixed capital assets. To ensure comparability across countries, the OECD capital services measures are based on a common computation method for all countries. See [10] .
capital productivity shows a strong tendency to reduce. This situation is probably the result of the increased use of capital input (ICT and non-ICT) which leads to a reduction in capital productivity, reduction that has been particularly accentuated by the international crisis and, probably, by a gradually increasing rigidity in output with respect to the use of this input.
With particular reference to the Italian situation ( Figure 5 ), it can be seen that the reduction in capital productivity is the result of both the steady increase in total capital services 3 and the poor growth in GDP. The increase in Italian total capital services was in line with that in Germany (+27.5% in Italy and +26.2% in Germany), but decidedly lower than in Spain (+82%), the USA (+55%), the United Kingdom (+48%) and France (+47%). However, the composition of total capital services is worth a mention. It includes both ICT capital (computer hardware, telecommunications equipment, computer software and databases) and non-ICT capital (transport equipment, other machinery and equipment and weapons systems, non-residential construction, research and development and other intellectual property products). In all the countries considered in the analysis, the greatest change in total capital services was that in ICT capital. This data provides clear evidence of technological change and its ongoing transformation and reflects the impact of what is commonly referred to as the "fourth industrial revolution". This is particularly evident if one considers that the increase in ICT capital was greater in Germany (+190%), i.e. precisely where the first steps in the industrial response (Industry 4.0) to the fourth revolution were taken.
The third productivity to be considered is the total factor (multifactor) productivity. Growth in multifactor productivity (MFP) "is measured as a residual, e.g. that part of GDP growth that cannot be explained by growth in labor and capital inputs. Traditionally, MFP growth is seen as capturing technological progress but, in practice, this interpretation needs some caution. First, some part of technological change is embodied in capital input, e.g. improvements in design and quality between two vintages of the same capital asset, and so its effects on GDP growth are attributed to the respective factor. MFP only picks up disembodied technical change, e.g. network effects or spillovers from production factors, the effects of better management practices, brand names, organizational change and general knowledge. Second, data and resource constraints hamper a 3 For productivity analysis, the preferred measure of capital input is the flow of productive services that can be drawn from the cumulative stock of past investments. These services are estimated by the OECD using the rate of change of the productive capital stock, which takes into account wear and tear, retirements and other sources of reduction in the productive capacity of fixed capital assets. The price of capital services per asset is measured as their rental price. In principle, the latter could be directly observed if markets existed for all capital services. In practice, however, rental prices have to be imputed for most assets, using the implicit rent that capital goods' owners "pay" to themselves (or the user costs of capital). Estimates of capital services in the OECD Productivity Database can be broken down by eight types of assets: computer hardware, telecommunications equipment, transport equipment, other machinery and equipment and weapons systems, non-residential construction, computer software and databases, research and development and other intellectual property products. To ensure comparability across countries, the OECD capital services measures are based on a common computation method for all countries. See [10] . precise measurement of labor and capital input, affecting MFP. Moreover, MFP also captures other factors such as adjustment costs, economies of scale and effects from imperfect competition." [11] As can be seen from Figure 6 , with the exception of Spain and Italy, MFP increased significantly in all the countries considered, with peaks of 15% in the USA and 11% in Germany. In Italy, however, MFP has actually decreased (-6%) since 2000 [12] [13] . This data must be seen in relation with the poor Italian labor productivity growth. In fact, MFP, together with capital deepening, is one of the determinants of labor productivity. In the Solow growth accounting model [14] , there is a close link between changes in labor productivity and MFP. If we assume that labor input corresponds to the total hours worked (disregarding the change in composition of the labor force), it follows that the rate of growth in the value added per hour worked (i.e., the rate of growth in labor productivity) is equal to the sum of the rate of growth in capital input per hour worked (capital deepening) and the rate of growth in MFP (which in this model coincides with technological progress) [8] . Capital deepening, or the capital intensity index (Figure 7) , shows a more or less evident increase for all the countries considered until 2013. The figure for Spain is noteworthy as it shows a frenetic growth until 2014. Once more, we can note that the international crisis caused a setback even in the capital deepening growth process in all countries.
However, the Italian situation is different. After the characteristic growth seen in all countries, Italy is the only one to have recorded a drop since 2013 and this decrease became more significant from 2015 onward. This fact is already implicit from the trend in total capital services ( Figure 5 ). Capital deepening is inevitably affected by the effect of spending on research and development (R&D) and technological innovation, and this could be a valid reason for the different performance of the changes in Italian capital deepening compared to other countries. Figure 8 shows the overall situation of the change in labor productivity in Italy It is clear that the change in Italian labor productivity is strongly influenced by the trend in MFP, while the trend in capital deepening has little effect. As capital deepening indicates an intensification in the use of capital-intensive techniques (and not simply a widening of capital stock), it can be argued that the Italian production structure, which is characterized by small and medium sized firms, did not allow an adequate use of the various types of capital. Added to this is the fact that the small size of the average Italian firm actually prevents adequate R&D investments, which could have a positive impact on multifactor productivity.
Besides, the effect of the interest rates reduction definitely had a lower impact in Italy than in other countries because of the high burden of its public debt. There has been less, and probably poorer, investment. In addition, small-medium sized Italian firms have greater difficulty accessing credit on the financial markets.
If we also look at Figure 9 , we can immediately see that Italian labor productivity growth has been characterized by a low ICT capital deepening component (in fact, it has actually reduced over time) and by a multifactor productivity component which has actually been negative in some years.
An Analysis of the Possible Causes of the Poor Growth in Italian Labor Productivity
The analysis shows that from 2000 to 2016 Italy recorded a very weak growth in labor productivity, especially when compared with that of its main competitors.
It is also obvious that this situation is the result, on the one hand, of lower ICT capital and mainly, on the other hand, and in contrast to other countries, of a reduction in multifactor productivity.
The structure of Italy's comparative advantages highlights the fact that this still predominantly manufacturing country has an atypical international production specialization compared to the other highly industrialized Western countries. In fact, it is oriented towards traditional sectors 4 (leather goods and footwear, textiles, clothing, furnishings and furniture). These typical "made in Italy"
sectors are unskilled-labor-intensive and low-technology-based. This means that labor productivity is in itself low and has less potential for growth. These characteristics have inevitably had an influence on the low use of ICT technologies [15] [16].
On the other hand, if we exclude the specialized mechanical sector (machinery and mechanical equipment), the Italian manufacturing production structure is American Journal of Industrial and Business Management A further element is added to all the above. In countries which, like Italy, are characterized by a manufacturing-type production structure, there has been a considerable development in the advanced producer services sector. This sector is skilled-labor-intensive and therefore has a high use of human capital and ICT technologies. However, in Italy this crucial sector has not been developing with the same intensity.
Moreover, in Italy the percentage of graduates amongst people aged between 25 and 34 is still very low (27%) if compared to the OECD average (44%) and the percentage of Italian graduates with scientific skills is equally poor [18] .
This has inevitable negative consequences on Italian human capital and has a negative effect on its R&D activity. 
Conclusions
This paper certainly deserves further insights but some preliminary observations can already be made.
The problem of productivity is undoubtedly one of the most debated issues in the economic, political and social world. The Italian situation is an interesting "workshop" for analysis and proposals of possible solutions. What is obvious is that multifactor productivity must be stimulated as growth in production systems is greatly reliant upon it. In reality, even though it may seem like an easy problem to solve, the actual definition of multifactor productivity demands complex reflections about its various components. One possible way forward could be to identify the sectors in which the effect of technology and human capital appear to be more relevant. In Italy the mechanical, chemical and manufacturing sectors in general could be the most fertile areas for work. An increase in R&D investment in these sectors could, together with a decided and informed reform of the education sector, already guarantee results in the medium term.
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